






This article focuses on transformation of collective identity in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip after the ‘Nakba’ (catastrophe) of 1948. The article argues that 
Arab identity, which was dominant in Palestine during the Mandate period, 
continued to be dominant after the ‘Nakba’. The weak Palestinian identity 
started to strengthen continuously among all Palestinians after the June War 
of 1967. In the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian identity 
greatly intensified and became the strongest identity in the last two to three 
decades. Comparison of collective identity before and after the Oslo Agreement 
shows that while under the Palestinian Authority (PA), Palestinian identity 
remained the strongest identity, Muslim identity and clan (or hamula) identity 
have greatly intensified. 
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Unlike the relatively rich literature on collective identity of Palestinians 
in Israel (see, for example, Peres and Yuval-Davis, 1969; Hofman, 1982; 
Rouhana, 1984, 1997; Mi’ari, 1986, 1987, 1992; Smooha, 1989, 1992; Suleiman, 
1999, 2002), very few studies, as far as we know, dealt with collective identity 
of Palestinians in other collectivities, especially those in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip (Al-Budairi, 1995; Mi’ari, 1998, 2004; Hassassian, 2001/2; Nassar, 
2001/2). These studies, dealing with collective identity of Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories, are primarily qualitative and lack empirical data. Only 
Mi’ari’s studies are quantitative and are based on data collected between the 
years 1994 and 2001 from representative samples of Palestinians in the West 
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It is well known that Palestinian Arabs’ collective identity had changed 
from one period to another during the century. The previous studies, including 
Mi’ari’s studies, have not dealt in depth with these changes. The present article 
aims to give a general picture on the transformation of collective identity of 
Palestinians in the last century and focuses on the following questions:
1. How had collective identity of Palestine Arabs developed in the last century, 
especially after the ‘nakba’ (catastrophe) of 1948?
2. Had collective identity changed after the formation of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Had it changed during 
the al-Aqsa Intifada?
3. How do Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip identify themselves 
today? More specifically, to what extent do they identify as Palestinian, as 
Arab and as Muslim or Christian? To what extent, also, do they identify 
with their clans and localities?
Methodology
The present study is both qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative side is 
based on reviewing some of the literature dealing with the socio-political struc-
ture of Palestinian society since the late Ottoman period until the present. This 
literature was helpful in understanding the transformation of collective identity 
until the early 1990s. While the quantitative side is based on data collected in 
five surveys: two surveys conducted in January and June 1994 on representative 
samples of Birzeit University students and three surveys conducted in 1997, 
2001 and 2006 on representative samples of the adult population in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.
Collective identity was measured in the five surveys, conducted by the author, 
by the following questions:
• To what extent do you feel Palestinian?
• To what extent do you feel Arab?
• To what extent do you feel Muslim or Christian?
• To what extent do you feel belonging to your clan (or ‘hamula’)?
• To what extent do you feel belonging to your place of residence (town, 
village or refugee camp)?
The first question measured Palestinian national identity, the second measured 
Arab national (or pan-Arab) identity, the third question measured religious 
identity and the last two questions measured traditional parochial (clan and 
local) identities. The answers to all these questions ranged in five categories: to 
a very little extent; to a little extent; to a moderate extent; to a great extent; and 
to a very great extent.
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Since the respondents can identify at the same time with different groups, it 
is important to know the main, or the most important, group with which they 
identify. As such, besides the ordinal measures of collective identity, the respond-
ents were asked ‘if you were requested to define your identity in one word, 
what would you say?’ The categories to this nominal question were Muslim or 
Christian, Arab, Palestinian and other.
In the last three surveys, conducted in 1997, 2001 and 2006, collective identity 
was also measured by questions about the extent to which the respondent is 
ready to sacrifice (in time, effort and money) for each of the following groups: 
Palestinian people, Arab nation, Muslim or Christian nation, respondent’s clan 
(‘hamula’) and respondent’s place of residence (town, village or refugee camp). 
The answers to these questions ranged in four categories: not ready; ready to 
some extent; ready; and much ready.
The Meaning of Identity
Unlike personal identity, which consists of aspects of the self that are based on 
individual characteristics, such as personal traits, social (or collective or group) 
identity consists of those aspects of the self that are based on group member-
ships. Personal and social identities are inversely related: when one’s focus is 
on oneself as a unique individual, the focus is not on oneself as a member of a 
group or groups, and vice versa (Stephan and Stephan, 1996). This article deals 
with social identity, which I prefer to call collective identity. I define collective 
identity as a sense of belonging to a group, or number of groups, in which 
membership is claimed. As such collective identity is a subjective state, and can 
exist at many different levels from family unit to sporting team, professional 
organization, political party, ethnic group, several ethnic groups forming a state 
or grouping of states as in the case of non-aligned nations. Although identity is a 
subjective state, it is generally anchored in objective features, such as territory, 
language, history and culture (Bostock and Smith, 2002).
In most contemporary societies, collective identity is formed of several 
com ponents (or sub-identities), representing several group memberships. The 
importance given to these components may vary from one period to another 
due to social and historical factors, such as state policy, social change, wars and 
interracial contact. Collective identity, as such, is multi-dimensional, socially con-
structed and varies from time to time. Similarly, collective identity of Palestinians 
is formed of several components representing several group member ships. Besides 
being Palestinian, sharing a common historical experience and struggling for 
independence, the Palestinians are: (1) Arab, sharing a common language, his-
tory and culture with the Arab World; (2) predominantly Muslim, with a small 
minority of Christians; and (3) members of narrow traditional groups, such as 
localities (towns, villages or refugee camps) and clans. The importance given to 
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these components has varied during the last century from one period to another 
due to social and historical factors (Mi’ari, 1998).
Transformation of Palestinians’ Identity
Following is a description of the transformation of collective identity of 
Palestinians, with focus on those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in the last 
century.
Identity before 1948
Palestine under the late Ottoman rule, known as ‘Southern Syria’, was not one 
administrative unit, but rather was divided between two or three administrative 
units (sanjacks). Most of the Muslim Arabs of Palestine, as well as those of 
the Ottoman Empire, identified themselves at that time as Arabs, Muslims and 
Ottomans (Al-Budairi, 1995; Nassar, 2001/2). While Arab identity was based 
on common language, history and culture, and Muslim identity on a common 
religion, Ottoman identity was based on a membership in the ‘community of 
believers’, that is on citizenship in the Muslim Ottoman Empire. These wide 
identities coexisted, of course, together with narrow local and tribal identities.
In response to the Young Turks Revolution of 1909, that brought to power 
a nationalist movement stressing Turkish rather than Islamic sentiment and 
tradition (Berger, 1964), a pan-Arab movement emerged, stressing Arab unity, 
based, as mentioned, on common language, history and culture (Brand, 1991). 
At the same time, a semi-organized Palestinian political opposition to Zionist 
colonization, especially to Jewish immigration and Jews’ purchase of land, 
which began in the 1880s, was carried out primarily by the newly established 
Arabic newspapers (Mi’ari, 1983).
During the First World War, and primarily when the Ottoman Empire broke 
up at the end of that war, Arab identity overcame its two competitors, the 
Ottoman and the traditional Muslim identities, and gained widespread public 
support. Arab unity, or Palestine’s unity with Syria, was considered the only way 
to repel the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine (Porat, 1975).
After the First World War, Palestine was separated from Syria and put under 
the British Mandate. The borders of mandatory Palestine were designed by the 
British and French colonial powers. In response to British rule between 1917 
and 1948 and to the intensified Zionist settlement in Palestine, a Palestinian 
Arab national movement emerged, aiming to establish an independent 
Palestinian state, in which Muslims, Christians and Jews live with equal rights. 
Accompanied with this development was the gradual growth of Palestinian 
national identity, which is the sense of belonging to Palestine as separate from 
Syria (Brand, 1991).
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Palestinian national movement, and Palestinian identity, during the man date 
period were weakened, among Palestine’s Arabs, by traditional and parochial, 
especially tribal, identities. The rivalries between the Husseini and Nashashibi 
families provide the most dramatic example of the divisive effect of these 
parochial identities (Nashif, 1977). As such, Arab and religious (Muslim and 
Christian) identities remained stronger than Palestinian identity, so that the 
‘neighboring Arab states, since the mid-thirties, became the decision maker 
regarding issues of Palestine Arabs’ (Al-Budairi, 1995: 16).
Identity between 1948 and 1967
Palestinian Arabs’ dependence on Arab states, to oppose the Zionist danger, 
did not yield the results they hoped for. As a result of the Arab–Jewish war of 
1948, the Arabs were defeated, and the state of Israel was established on one 
part of Palestine. Another part, Gaza Strip, was administered by Egypt, and 
a third part, the West Bank, was annexed by Jordan. By the end of the war 
there were about 700,000 Palestinian Arab refugees dispersed in Gaza Strip, 
the West Bank and in neighboring Arab countries, especially Jordan, Lebanon 
and Syria. Today only about half of the Palestinian Arabs live in their home 
country. Israeli official statistics estimate that by the end of the year 2003 there 
were about 1,100,000 Palestinian Arabs in Israel, not including the annexed 
East Jerusalem (about 200,000) (Israel, 2004), and Palestinian official statistics 
estimate the number of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as 
of the first quarter of 2004, at 3,767,000 persons (2,385,000 in the West Bank 
and 1,382,000 in Gaza Strip) (Birzeit University, 2005).
The process of ‘pan-Arabization’ of the Arab struggle in Palestine was 
only intensified by the defeat of 1948 and the consequent fragmentation of 
the Palestinian Arab people (Porat, 1975). The fragmented Palestinian Arabs 
com mitted their cause, the liberation of Palestine, to the Arab Nationalist 
Move ment, led by Egypt’s Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s. In this period, many 
Palestinians joined pan-Arab organizations, of which the most prominent was 
the Movement of Arab Nationalists, which stressed Arab unity as the only road 
that could lead to victory in the struggle against Israel and colonialism in general 
(Baumgarten, 2005). It was not surprising, therefore, that under the dominance 
of pan-Arab thought in this period, Palestinian identity and Muslim identity 
were absent from Palestinian National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Qawmi al-Filastini) 
of 1964 (Abrash, 2004). As such, Arab national, or pan-Arab, identity remained 
salient among Palestinian Arabs during the first two decades following the 
‘catastrophe’ (an-nakba) of 1948.
While Palestinian identity in this period remained relatively weak, it developed 
differently in the different segments of the Palestinian people. This identity 
grew up among Diaspora Palestinians as a result of the uprooting, the refugee 
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experience and the exclusion from the particular national identities (such as 
the Lebanese, the Syrian and the Kuwaiti) which were developing around them 
(Nassar, 2001/2). Political repression and national discrimination applied against 
Diaspora Palestinians, especially in Lebanon, have not succeeded in stopping 
the diffusion of Palestinian national consciousness. United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) schools, despite the fact that they were not under 
Palestinians’ control, actually served as sites of national consciousness. Many 
teachers in these schools took national occasions as an opportunity to talk on 
Palestine and to teach their pupils national songs (Sayegh, 1983).
In Gaza Strip, administered by Egypt, Palestinian national identity also had 
grown up. The Egyptian government did not annex this area, referred to it as 
a Palestinian territory and, therefore, did not oppose (if it did not encourage) 
Palestinian identity. Besides, several political parties and movements were 
founded in Gaza Strip: Muslim Brothers, Palestinian Communist Party, Arab 
Socialist Baáth Party, Movement of Arab Nationalists and Movement of 
Palestine Liberation (Fateh). Although some parties, especially the Muslim 
Brothers and the Communist Party, were repressed in certain periods, these 
parties gave priority in their ideologies to the Palestinian problem, mobilized 
the public and intensified Palestinians’ political awareness (Abu Ámr, 1987). 
These factors may explain the dominant role which Palestinians from Gaza 
Strip had played in rebuilding the Palestinian political sphere, especially the 
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Hilal, 2002).
As opposed to its status in the Diaspora and Gaza Strip, Palestinian identity 
took a longer time to take root in the West Bank, which was annexed to Jordan. 
The Jordanian government applied a policy of integration toward West Bank 
Palestinians, as reflected by giving them all citizenship rights according to 
the Law of Citizenship of 1954 and absorbing a big part of their labor force 
in military and governmental offices. On the other hand, this policy of inte-
gration was more formal and symbolic, because power positions were occupied 
primarily by original Jordanians, and the Government applied a policy of 
Jordan ization toward its Palestinian citizens (Sayegh, 1983; Al-Budairi, 1995; 
Nassar, 2001/2; Hilal, 2002). Although no empirical studies were conducted on 
collective identity of West Bank Palestinians in this period, we suggest that 
if these Palestinians were asked about their main identity, they would answer 
either Jordanian or Arab.
Palestinian identity remained weak also among the Palestinians in Israel, who, 
as a result of the war of 1948, were frustrated because of the defeat, leaderless 
because Palestinian leadership left the country during the war and isolated from 
the Palestinian people and the Arab World as a whole. Israel’s policy toward 
its Palestinian minority was determined by an overriding objective: to control 
this minority rather than to eliminate, integrate, absorb or develop it. Israel’s 
policy of control was made up of three components: segmentation (designed 
 Mi’ari: Transformation of Collective Identity in Palestine 585
to fragment Arab minority along family and religious lines and to isolate it 
from Jewish majority); dependence (designed to make Arabs dependent on 
Jews socially, economically and politically); and cooptation (designed to co-opt 
potential Arab leaders by means of side payments, such as favors, privileges 
and special dispensations) (Lustick, 1980). As a result, the frustrated, leader-
less, fragmented, isolated and repressed Palestinians in Israel tended to accept 
the new political reality and identify themselves as ‘Israeli-Arabs’ (Mi’ari, 
1986, 1992).
Identity between 1967 and the Mid-1990s
The failure of Arab nationalism to achieve Arab unity and liberate Palestine, 
as reflected by Arabs’ massive defeat in the June War of 1967, strengthened 
Palestinian identity and taught Palestinians that they should rely on themselves 
in the struggle to liberate Palestine. After that war, the Movement for the libera-
tion of Palestine (Fateh) dominated the Palestinian national movement and 
took over the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was established 
in 1964. Contrary to Arab nationalism which stressed the liberation of Palestine 
through Arab unity, Fateh adopted a Palestinian nationalist ideology, accord-
ing to which Palestine would be liberated by Palestinian action, with Palestinian 
refugees taking matters into their own hands.1 Fateh emphasized Palestinian, 
rather than Arab, identity, which it considered to be essential for liberating 
Palestine (Baumgarten, 2005). As such, Palestinian identity as well as pan-Arab 
identity, and ambiguously Muslim identity, were indicated in the Palestinian 
National Pact of 1968 (modified in Arabic to al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Filastini) 
(Abrash, 2004).
Content analysis of official Palestinian political discourse shows that the domi-
nant expressions in the PLO political discourse between 1974 and 1993 were 
Palestinian national expressions, such as national unity, representation of the 
PLO and the independence of Palestinian decision. Pan-Arab expressions, such 
as Arab unity and Palestine as a part of the Arab nation, which were dominant 
with the establishment of the PLO in 1964, have been weakened since the early 
1970s, but remained much stronger than the Islamic expressions (Irgan, 2006).
Palestinian identity was intensified in this period as a result of several 
external developments (that took place outside historical Palestine) and internal 
developments (that took place in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip). The 
main external developments were:
1. The October War of 1973 which, unlike previous Arab–Israeli wars, did 
not end with an overwhelming Israeli triumph, but rather with some kind 
of balance. This war destroyed the myth of the ‘unconquered Israeli army’, 
and renewed Arabs’ self-confidence.
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2. The wide international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people. This recognition was reflected by a 
number of resolutions taken by the United Nations General Assembly, 
among which was the acceptance of the PLO as an observer-member in the 
United Nations in 1974.
3. Egypt’s withdrawal from the circle of Arab–Israeli conflict as a result of 
Camp David separate peace agreement with Israel in 1978. The PLO, as 
well as all Palestinians, opposed this agreement.
4. Several massacres against Palestinians were committed by Arab regimes and 
parties, the ugliest of them were ‘Sabra and Shatila’ of 1982 in Lebanon.
5. Israel, especially since the late 1970s, intensified its aggression against 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The peak of this aggression was 
Israel’s invasion of South Lebanon in 1982, and the repressive measures it 
applied against the Palestinians there.
These developments, together, intensified Palestinian identity, that is the feeling 
of belonging to the Palestinian people, among almost all Palestinians (Sayegh, 
1979; Mi’ari, 1986).
Besides these external developments, several internal developments took 
place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation, which contri-
buted to the increasing growth of Palestinian national identity.
Israeli Policy of Control and Repression
Since its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel applied 
a policy aiming to control the local political, economic and social institutions, 
on the one hand, and to tighten Palestinians’ dependence on Israel, on the 
other. During the first two decades of the occupation, Israel expropriated 
52 percent of the land in the West Bank and 42 percent of the land in Gaza. The 
land has been confiscated both for ‘security reasons’ and for the construction 
of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. Besides, Israel applied vari-
ous repressive measures against the Palestinians, such as control over water 
resources, closing universities for long periods, strict censorship on press, cur-
fews, collective punishments, arrests, deportation and demolition of houses 
(FACTS, 1988).
Increase of the PLO Influence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
The influence of the PLO, and the various Palestinian factions forming it, 
intensified in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the early 1970s. These factions 
worked to increase their bases among the various social strata and segments 
(towns, villages, refugee camps, women, youth, students, workers and other 
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professionals). As a result, political participation of the public increased, and 
new social strata, such as workers, peasants and refugees from the camps, began 
to have more influence on Palestinian political life (Hilal, 2002). But we have to 
add that the part of the lower strata in the political leadership was lower than 
their proportional size in society, as indicated by the fact that while, for example, 
the workers during the first Intifada were overrepresented among Palestinians 
killed and those administratively detained by occupation authorities, are less 
represented among Palestinians expelled, who were dominant political leaders. 
Middle class members, especially those of free professions and university students 
formed the majority of the expulsions during the first Intifada (Mi’ari, 1994).
Internal National Political Elite Supported by the PLO
During the first few years after Israeli occupation, the political elite in the West 
bank and Gaza Strip was predominantly pro-Jordanian (as-Salhi, 1993), and the 
majority of the West Bank population identified with Jordan (Cohen, 1975). 
Since the early 1970s, a national political elite, supported by the PLO, was 
formed. This elite was reflected by the Palestinian National Front (1973), the 
Committee of National Guidance (1978) and the Unified National Leadership 
of the Uprising (beginning of 1988). The political elite, representing primarily 
middle class and lower class families, were predominantly leftist. But since the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s the party membership of the elite has changed: 
the weight of the secular leftist parties in the elite decreased, while the weight of 
Fateh and the Muslim movement have increased (Mi’ari, 1996; Hilal, 2002).
Civil Society Organizations
Besides the PLO factions, who worked underground in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, various non-governmental and mass organizations, especially of 
students, women, workers and youth, were formed. The most important of 
these organizations were the student organizations, representing a large stratum 
of students studying in the newly established Palestinian universities: Birzeit, 
Najah, Bethlehem, Hebron and Jerusalem in the West Bank, and the Islamic 
University and al-Azhar in Gaza Strip. In 1993–4 the total number of students 
in these universities was about 20,000 (Mi’ari, 1996). The big majority of the 
student population came from peasants, refugees and lower class families. 
The student organizations led the political struggle against Israeli occupation 
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. They organized strikes, demonstrations 
and other forms of protest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the univers-
ities, especially Birzeit University, were held political and cultural gatherings, 
attended by thousands of youth from various schools, universities and mass 
organizations (Taraki, 1990).
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These developments contributed to continuous and increasing growth 
of Palestinian national identity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While no 
empirical studies were conducted on collective identity in these areas until 
the early 1990s, the explosion of the First Intifada in December 1987 against 
Israeli occupation indicates high political awareness and increased Palestinian 
feeling. Empirical data collected in the early 1990s indicate that Palestinian 
identity became stronger than Muslim and Arab identities. In a Fafo Institute 
for Applied International Studies (Norway) (FAFO) living conditions survey, 
conducted in 1992 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in response to the 
question ‘For whom would you be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice’, the 
most frequent answer was ‘sacrifice for the family’, followed, in order, by sacri-
fice for the Palestinian people, Muslim nation and lastly for the Arab nation 
(Heiberg and Ovensen, 1992). Another survey, conducted in 1994 by the author 
on a representative sample of Birzeit University students, showed that the most 
frequent identity was Palestinian national identity, followed, in order, by local 
identity (of place of residence), Arab national identity, religious identity and 
lastly clan (or tribal) identity (Mi’ari, 1998).
Many studies have shown that Palestinian identity has intensified since the 
mid-1970s also among Palestinians in Israel (e.g. Rouhana, 1984; Mi’ari, 1987, 
1992; Smooha, 1989). Besides the external developments, mentioned earlier, 
several internal developments, that took place among Palestinians in Israel, 
intensified Palestinian identity. Among these developments were: the continu-
ation of Israeli policy of Arab land expropriation, the transformation of Arab 
farmers into semi-skilled or unskilled workers in Jewish cities, the appearance of 
a wide stratum of educated Arabs formed primarily of university graduates and 
students and the formation of several country-wide Arab organizations such as 
the Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Councils (1974), the Committee for 
the Defense of Arab Lands (1975) and the Higher Pursuing Committee of the 
Arabs in Israel (1987).
Identity under the Palestinian Authority (PA)
In September 1993, an agreement of ‘Declaration of Principles’ (DOP) was 
signed between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization (PLO) to set up a transitional self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
This agreement was followed by the establishment of a Palestinian Authority 
(PA) in 1994 on parts of these territories. From that time until the al-Aqsa 
Intifada and Israeli reoccupation of the PA areas in 2001, the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, called Palestine, were undergoing a state formation process. 
Although the Palestinians were only in partial control of parts of the occupied 
territories,2 and despite the fact that the territories’ international status 
remained unsettled and contested, a Palestinian state apparatus was formed. 
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This quasi-state established a presidency, a government, an elected parliament 
(Palestinian Legislative Council, PLC), courts and several security organizations 
(Amundsen and Ezbidi, 2002).
Content analysis of political discourse of the PA, dominated by Fateh until 
the last Palestinian elections held in January 2006, reveals that the Palestinian 
national dimension remained very strong, the Islamic dimension remained very 
weak and the pan-Arab dimension nearly disappeared from that discourse 
(Irgan, 2006).
Comparison of data collected prior the establishment of the PA (in 1994) and 
data collected under the PA (in 1997, 2001 and 2006)3 shows the following.
Dominance of Palestinian Identity
Palestinian national identity continued to be the strongest identity under the 
PA in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As Table 1 shows, the percentages of 
respondents who felt, much or very much, they were Palestinian in the various 
surveys are higher than all other percentages, such as those who felt they were 
Arab and those who felt they were Muslim or Christian (91 percent of the 
respondents in 1997, 96 percent in 2001 and 91 percent in 2006 felt, much or 
very much, they were Palestinian). Also Table 2 shows that the percentages of 
the respondents in the various surveys who were ready to make sacrifice for the 
Palestinian people are a little bit higher than those who were ready to make 
sacrifice for the Muslim nation and for place of residence, and are clearly higher 
than those who were ready to make sacrifice for the Arab nation and those for 
their clans (or hamulas).
While Palestinian identity continued to be the strongest identity, it lost 
some of its dominance under the PA, as a result of the strengthening of other 
identities, especially the Muslim identity. As such, the gap in strength between 
Palestinian identity and Muslim identity has decreased, as will be shown in the 
following item.
Table 1
Collective identity of adult population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in certain years 
(percentages of respondents who said they ‘feel much’ or ‘feel very much’ belonging 
to various groups)a
January 1994 June 1994 Oct 1997 Jul–Aug 2001 April 2006
Feels Palestinian 92.0 89.2 92.9 96.1 92.4
Feels Arab 63.3 63.9 86.9 89.5 80.6
Feels Muslim or Christian 55.8 53.5 78.3 91.9 88.1
Feels belonging to residence 71.2 71.4 84.8 92.5 87.9
Feels belonging to hamula 47.1 44.2 72.2 82.4 78.4
Note: a The rest of the respondents answered ‘to a moderate extent’ or ‘to a little extent’ or ‘to a very little extent’.
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Strengthening of Muslim Identity
While Palestinian identity continued to be very strong in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip under the PA, Muslim identity has highly been strengthened, espe-
cially during the al-Aqsa Intifada. The respondents who identified as Muslim 
or Christian increased from 54–56 percent in 1994 to 78 percent in 1997, 
92 percent in 2001 and 88 percent in 2006 (see Table 1). Also the percentages of 
the respondents in the three surveys conducted under the PA who were ready 
to make sacrifice for their religious group are very close to those who were 
ready to make sacrifice for the Palestinian people (see Table 2).
Muslim identity, as perceived the main identity, has also intensified. In 
response to the question ‘If you were asked to define your identity in one 
word what would you answer?’ the percentage of respondents who answered 
‘Muslim’ has highly increased under the PA (see Table 3). While in 1994 
Palestinian identity, as the main identity, was clearly dominant, under the PA it 
lost some of its dominance in favor of Muslim identity. Palestinians under the 
PA became nearly polarized between those who consider themselves primarily 
as Palestinian and those who consider themselves primarily as Muslim, although 
Table 2
Readiness of adult population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to make sacrifice for 
several belonging groups in certain years (percentages of respondents who said ‘ready’ 
or ‘much ready’)a
1997 2001 2006
Clan (hamula) 72.6 82.3 80.2
Place of residence (town, village or camp) 83.1 90.0 84.6
Religious group (Muslim or Christian nation) 80.6 90.5 86.0
Palestinian people 87.6 92.3 88.4
Arab nation 62.8 59.9 56.2
Note: a The rest of the respondents answered ‘not ready’ or ‘ready to some extent’. 
Table 3
Main collective identity of adult population in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in certain years
Identitya January 1994 June 1994 Oct 1997 Jul–Aug 2001 April 2006
Muslim or Christian 21.6 16.5 47.0 38.1 42.9
Arab 11.5 13.4  6.7  4.5 6.6
Palestinian 66.9 70.1 46.3 57.4 50.5
Total %











Note: a Category ‘other’ (4%–5%) was excluded. 
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this polarization has been weakened during the al-Aqsa Intifada in favor of 
Palestinian identity (the percentages of respondents who identified primarily 
as Palestinian and those who identified primarily as Muslim changed from 
46 percent versus 47 percent in 1997 to 57 percent versus 38 percent in 2001 
and 51 percent versus 43 percent in 2006). The intensification of Palestinian 
identity as the main identity during the al-Aqsa Intifada could be explained by 
the fact that the Intifada is better described as a national struggle, rather than a 
religious struggle, for independence.
The strengthening of Muslim identity was primarily caused by the increas-
ing popularity of the Islamic movement spearheaded by Hamas (Hassassian, 
2001–2), which was founded in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the start of 
the first Intifada in December 1987.4 The pact of Hamas, and that of Islamic 
Jihad, emphasized Muslim identity alone, and ignored Palestinian identity even 
on the level of slogans and flag. Palestine according to them is a pure Islamic 
wakf (endowment), which after liberation will be part of the Muslim state 
(Abrash, 2004). The increasing popularity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, accom-
panied by the strengthening of Muslim identity, primarily occurred as a result 
of the following factors.
The Worsening of Socioeconomic Conditions
In a survey conducted by the author on a representative sample from the 
adult population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1997, 41 percent of the 
respondents assessed that their family economic status has worsened under PA 
rule, 49 percent assessed that their economic status has not changed and only 
10 percent assessed that their economic status has improved. The socioeco-
nomic status has worsened more during the al-Aqsa Intifada. Official statistics 
have shown that unemployment rates in 2004 have reached 29.2 percent 
in Gaza Strip and 23.8 percent in the West Bank (Birzeit University, 2005). 
The worsening socioeconomic conditions decreased the popularity of the PA, 
and increased the popularity of the Islamic movement and, thus, intensified 
Muslim identity.
The Failure of the Political Peace Process
The failure of the political peace process was reflected by the explosion of 
the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, Israel’s reoccupation of Palestinian 
areas, termed ‘A’ and controlled by the PA, the stopping of peace negotiations 
between Palestinians and Israelis and Israel’s division of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip into several closed areas, or cantons. These areas lack geographical 
continuity as a result of Israel’s building the annexation wall and spreading 
out dozens of military check points. The failure of the political peace process, 
accompanied by geographical fragmentation of Palestinian Territories, Israeli 
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repressive measures (such as killings, arrests, closures, curfews) and internal 
political disorder (primarily weapon disorder), decreased the popularity of the 
PA5 and increased the popularity of the Islamic movement and, thus, intensified 
Muslim identity.
Reports of Corruption within the PA
Reports of corruption within the PA, published in recent years, stressed the 
existence of favoritism, misuse of funds, faulty and no effective administration, 
weak accountability and transparency, security disorder and lawlessness in 
Palestinian areas. The PA was further undermined by the eruption of several 
corruption scandals, involving Palestinian key leaders and figures (Kayyali, 
1998; Amundsen and Ezbidi, 2002; Abu Nima, 2004; Palestine Facts, 2006).6 
Documented reports, prepared by investigation committees, appointed by 
Palestinian legislative Council, accused few ministers in corruption. In addition, 
popular allegations and rumors about corruption in the PA were spreading. On 
the other hand, Yasser Arafat did not react as requested to these reports and 
rumors, and the ministers accused of corruption remained in their positions. 
This situation deepened the gap between the PA and the public, and increased 
the popularity of Hamas.
Strengthening of Parochial Identities
Other traditional identities, especially clan (or ‘hamula’) identity, have also 
strengthened under the PA, and strengthened more during the al-Aqsa Intifada. 
The percentages of the respondents who felt belonging to their clans increased 
from 44–47 percent in 1994 to 72 percent in 1997, 82 percent in 2001 and 
78 percent in 2006 (see Table 1). Also readiness to make sacrifice for the clan 
is relatively high under the PA, and this readiness has increased during the al-
Aqsa Intifada (see Table 2).
The above factors (the worsening of socioeconomic conditions, the failure 
of the political peace process, accompanied by the fragmentation of Palestinian 
Territories, and reports of corruption within the PA) strengthened also trad-
itional parochial identities, such as local and clan identities. The Palestine 
Human Development Report of 2004 refers to the role played by traditional 
social institutions, such as the tribal councils and the tribal judiciary system, in 
preserving Palestinian society. Although traditional social institutions do not 
always ensure justice for marginalized social groups, such as women, children 
and the poor, and rarely address the core factors that create social problems, 
these institutions provided acceptable solutions for some of the difficulties 
faced by society, communicated among different sectors of Palestinian society, 
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and provided social solidarity, tribal justice and assistance to needy families. 
Traditional institutions also slow the processes of geographic fragmentation and 
social disintegration brought on by Israeli occupation (Birzeit University, 2005).
Traditional parochial identities were also strengthened by the following two 
factors.
The Weakening of Palestinian Parties
The weakening of Palestinian parties, especially the leftist parties, under the 
PA was reflected by the decline of their activities, the absence of their political 
programs and the decrease of their popularity. Among the factors that led to 
this phenomenon, called the ‘crisis of Palestinian parties’, were the collapse of 
the Communist bloc, especially the Soviet Union, the transformation of the 
PLO from dogmatism to political pragmatism and the intensive concern of 
Palestinian parties, especially the opposition parties, in matters of civil society 
rather than in political issues (al-Malki, 1999). There is no doubt that the PA 
has also marginalized political parties as a result of their exclusion from peace 
negotiations with Israel. The weakening of political parties, as wide national 
organizations, usually strengthens traditional, local and clan groupings.
PA Support of Clan Structure
As a neo-patriarchal regime (Schulz, 2002), circling around Yasser Arafat 
(until his death in 2004), the PA strengthened traditional local groupings. This 
role was reflected by the PA support of traditional clan representatives, called 
‘mukhtars’, the establishment of a ‘Committee of Clan Affairs’ connected to 
the president’s office, and the policy of appointments based, primarily, on party 
and family considerations (Hilal, 1998; Afeefa, 2005). The appointment of 
governmental elite members (such as ministers, deputy ministers and the heads 
of public institutions) required, besides political loyalty, the fulfillment of more 
than one of the following requirements: leading position in the ruling party, 
academic qualification and a remarkable family or regional position (Hilal, 
2002). The policy of appointments was described as a ‘spoils system’ (Sayegh, 
2001), according to which governmental offices, perceived as spoils, are occu-
pied primarily by members from the ruling party (Fateh). A survey conducted on 
university graduates has shown that the big majority of the respondents believe 
that the most important factors in appointments are favoritism, family belong-
ing and party membership (Abu Hilal, 1997). The PA has marginalized political 
parties, as we have indicated, on the one hand, and strengthened traditional 
(local and clan) groupings, on the other. It seems that it was easier for the PA 
to get clans’ loyalties than parties’ loyalties, in return for some minor privileges 
and economic incentives (such as payments and relative appointments).
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Conclusion
In this article we tried to clarify the transformation of collective identity among 
Palestinian Arabs in the last century, with focus on those in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. We have shown that Arab identity, which was dominant during the 
mandate period, continued to be dominant after the ‘Nakba’ (catastrophe) of 
1948. The weak Palestinian identity started to strengthen continuously among 
all Palestinians after the June War of 1967. In the Israeli occupied West Bank 
and Gaza Strip Palestinian identity greatly intensified and became the strongest 
identity in the last two to three decades. Besides several external developments, 
that took place outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as the widespread 
international recognition of Palestinian right to self-determination and Arabs’ 
massacres against Palestinians, several internal developments, that took place 
inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, contributed to the dominance of Palestinian 
national identity. Among these internal developments are: the repressive policy 
applied by Israeli occupation; the increase of the PLO influence in the occupied 
Palestinian Territories; the growth of an internal national elite supported by the 
PLO; and the formation of several civil society organizations.
Comparison of collective identity before and after the Oslo Agreement shows 
that while under the PA Palestinian identity remained the strongest identity, 
Muslim identity has greatly intensified, primarily as a result of the increasing 
popularity of Hamas. The worsening of socioeconomic conditions, the failure 
of the political peace process and the issue of corruption within the PA have all 
contributed to the increasing popularity of Hamas and to the intensification of 
Muslim identity. Other traditional (especially clan) identities have also intensi-
fied, as a result of the previous factors as well as of other factors, such as the 
weakening of Palestinian parties and PA support of clan structure.
While, at present, all identities (Palestinian, religious, Arab, clan and local) 
are strong, Palestinian identity remains the strongest. If people in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip are asked to define their identity in one word, the biggest 
part of them answers ‘Palestinian’ (51 percent in 2006) and another big part, 
although smaller (43 percent in 2006), answers ‘Muslim’ or ‘Christian’. In other 
words, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are nearly polarized 
between those who consider themselves primarily as Palestinian and those who 
consider themselves primarily as Muslim or Christian. Palestinians who con-
sider themselves primarily as Arab form only a minor percentage (7 percent in 
2006). The failure of the pan-Arab movement in the late 1960s, followed by the 
strengthening of Palestinian nationalism and later by the Palestinian Islamic 
movement, may explain this finding.
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Notes
1. Until 1988 Fateh called for liberating Palestine through armed struggle. At the meeting of the 
Palestine National Council (PNC) held in Algiers in 1988 Fateh adopted a new approach: the 
establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel through diplomatic means.
2. According to the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority was designed to have control over 
both security-related and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas (referred to as ‘Area A’) 
and only civilian control over Palestinian rural areas (‘Area B’). The remainder of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip (including Israeli settlements, the Jordan Valley region and bypass roads 
between Palestinian communities) were to remain under exclusive Israeli control (‘Area C’).
3. Despite the difference in the population studied prior and under the PA (Birzeit University 
students versus West Bank and Gaza Strip adult population), we assess the comparison is 
possible due to the fact that no significant differences in collective identity were found between 
students and total population in the surveys conducted under the PA.
4. Contrary to ‘Arab unity’ proposed by the Arab national movement and ‘Palestinian nationalism’ 
proposed by Fateh as the road to Palestine, Hamas proposed ‘Islam as the solution and the 
alternative’ and called for total liberation of Palestine through struggle (jihad).
5. Decreasing popularity of the PA was reflected by the public’s low trust in the PNA institutions, 
such as police, courts and ministers and low satisfaction about the PA performance in various 
fields, such as in providing security, order and general services (Mi’ari, 2003).
6. Among these corruption scandals there was one involving the former prime minister, Ahmad 
Queia. A cement company, owned by his family, was selling cement to Israeli settlements and 
for the construction of the Separation Wall. Another corruption scandal talked about money 
transfers ($11.5 million) from Swiss banks to private accounts in France owned by Suha Arafat, 
the wife of former president, Yasser Arafat (Abu Nima, 2004).
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